We are a commune of inquiring, skeptical, politically centrist, capitalist, anglophile, traditionalist New England Yankee humans, humanoids, and animals with many interests beyond and above politics. Each of us has had a high-school education (or GED), but all had ADD so didn't pay attention very well, especially the dogs. Each one of us does "try my best to be just like I am," and none of us enjoys working for others, including for Maggie, from whom we receive neither a nickel nor a dime. Freedom from nags, cranks, government, do-gooders, control-freaks and idiots is all that we ask for.
That sounds like something people in Corporate would come up with. While it is likely to be true in most cases, many major disasters happen when a number of individually recoverable missteps combine in an unanticipated fashion to cause a situation to get suddenly out of control. The TMI nuclear reactor failure, many airplane crashes (e.g. Tenerife), and arguably the Challenger disaster, among others, are examples. (The SRB joint putty formulation notwithstanding, the engineers knew of multiple incidents where partial burn-through short of total failure had happened, but their management refused to act on their concerns.) No set of rules in a 3-ring binder will prevent all of these complex system failures.
I hate it that the book uses the loss of Challenger as an example. I was there when Challenger blew up and it still pisses me off. What pisses me off even more is that the root cause of the accident has never been admitted: The change in the SRB joint putty to satisfy the environmentalists. The definitive article was Did risk reduction backfire in space? by Malcolm Ross and published at SEPP [Science and Environmental Policy Project]. Luckily, I saved a copy because the article has been scrubbed from the Internet.
I took Charles's course at [unnamed Ivy League beginning with Y] back in 1985 so at least in the edition in those days Challenger had not happened yet. He did talk at length about Apollo 13 - his point was that it was hard to envision a more motivated, experienced and intelligent workforce than NASA in the 60s/70s, yet the sheer complexity of systems meant for unanticipated interactions. I think that in the intervening 35 years we have seen the motivation and experience decrease in most (if not all) corporate and governmental teams while complexity has further increased.