Maggie's Farm

With respect to Erdogan’s own political party, the AKP, it should come as no surprise that it – like any major political party, anywhere – is a “fractious, unwieldy coalition.” Robbins believes there are indications of  “a major political split brewing within the AKP ranks.”

Robbins points at one important indication, the criticism of Turkey’s role and that of the IHH in the Gaza blockade runners by the “for many Turks the spiritual conscience of Turkish Islam, culturally and politically”, the controversial exile, Imam Fethullah Gulen.

My sense is Gulen saw who was running the Gaza operation and remanded governmental acolytes for their neglect in allowing a competing group to circumvent their so-called Sufi bearings.

So, I asked, who are other players in Erdogan’s coalition?

The IHH appears to be coming out of the more radical Saadet (Felicity) Party network, which has its differences with AKP. Saadet is the rump survivor of Necmettin Erbakan's pre-AKP Islamic parties. While it is nominally aligned with AKP they believe Erdogan and Co. are too soft philosophically. Conversely, the AKP sees Saadet  as moustache Pete's, whose viewpoint is based on a concept known as "The National View." In short, it’s a philosophy which rejects Turkey's Western orientation wholesale and advocates a return to the glorious years of Ottoman sovereignty over dar-ul-Islam, replete with an Islamic common market, currency etc. Although Saadet never gets more than 5-6% of the national vote in general elections, they nonetheless still exert a notable influence in Turkey’s political Islam discourse.

And others?

It's a Baskin Robbins medley of various and sundry who had a beef with Turkish politics up until the 2002 election which brought the AKP to power. Saadet essentially represents the radical side of the spectrum. As a result, instead of being a lauded MSM "statesman" Erdogan has to constantly zig and zag to keep his government together. Overall, I think there's as much bad management going on as Islamic infiltration.

There’s a festering conflict between AKP's “neo-Ottomanism” outlook and Saadet’s old school National View. The former is basically a watered down version of the National View, more palatable for general tastes. I sense that the Saadet folks are pissed their copyright has been usurped and repolished without their say.

What about the main opposition political party, the CHP?

It's a party undergoing a major rehaul and at this point doesn't pose a credible challenge to AKP's dominance. Granted they're ultra-secularist, but that doesn't automatically translate in being US-friendly. Their ideology is based in Eurosocialist thinking, a top-down outlook where the state predominates. Such outmoded thinking (this was the party that Ataturk founded btw) was one of the major reasons AKP came to power.  The 64,000 Turkish Lira question is whether CHP is capable of reforming its octogenarian core beliefs.

If elections were held today, CHP would fare better than their last two performances, but  not enough to unseat AKP. A best case scenario would have them forming part of a coalition government and Turkish political history shows it would be short-lived.

What about the referendum in September, to place the judiciary under Erdogan control?

The judiciary is the secularists' last line of defense against AKP creeping Islamization. The military's been largely neutered as an intervening force and as mentioned above, there really is no credible political alternative on the horizon. If the referendum is successful (which seems likely) it will effectively signal the end of Ataturk's legacy.

What about Turkey’s buddying up with Iran, with Syria?

Blame it on the Cold War ending. Once Turkey no longer  served as the southern bulwark to potential Soviet aggression, a geopolitical void had to be filled. Enter the return of history or neo-Ottomanism as it's popularly labeled. Previously derided enemies became potential trade markets like Syria, whose history also intertwines with the Ottoman Empire's. Syria also served Turkey as a Europe-Orient landbridge concept fancied by EU and Washington bureaucrats.

Besides the geopolitical/economic perspective, much of AKP's support base comes from the provincial cities bordering Syria and even Iraq. Once bazaar-economy locales have burgeoned into bustling factory zones during Erdogan's tenure.

As for Iran, much of the bonhommie deals with Turkish overdependency on Iranian gas supply. While there are attempts to diversify, nothing can suffice a next door supplier who in turn looks for an accessible route to European markets.

Should the US be taking a sterner posture with Ankara, or what should the US do that’s constructive?

It's time to seriously reassess our post-Cold War relations with Turkey. It's no longer a bulwark against aggression but a potential conduit to - particularly if Iran goes nuclear. Turkey is undergoing profound changes, and much of it doesn't bode well for US interests. Perhaps reviewing aid programs and whether they're effectively serving our interests is one way to signal concerns. It's highly unlikely with this administration's dispositions however.

(I read this earlier today and include it here as relevant. Daniel Pipes says there may still be a chance that Turkey can be drawn back from its radical Islamist drift.  But, that’s unlikely as Pipes analyzes the prospects.)