Maggie's Farm

At the risk of engaging in yet another lengthy and unproductive conversation like the last one I offer the following:

Zach: The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment debated extensively who would be included.

A statement that the framers of the 14th Amendment debated extensively is not in itself dispositive of your argument. A statement that they framed it purposefully while also explicitly excluding some groups is not in itself dispositive of your argument. Comments made with the tone of authority and superior knowledge are not necessarily true and correct.

As far as such debate is concerned:

A May 30th, 1886 publication of the "Congressional Globe" records a conversation in the U.S. Senate as Michigan Senator Jacob Howard proposed his amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The text he proposed was approved and later became the first Article of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

"This will not , of course , include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens , who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons."

Jurisdiction Standard: Howard and other framers, such as Senator Lyman Trumbull, clarified that "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" meant "complete jurisdiction" or not owing allegiance to anybody else,...


You may be correct in your presumption that babies born even to illegal aliens become citizens automatically if born on United States soil. The matter has never been directly ruled on by the Supreme Court, and the framers of the 14th Amendment specifically said that of course it did not include persons born in the United States who are foreigners or aliens.

Zach: The argument is that they crafted the language of the Amendment to include and exclude certain groups

I repeat: "This will not , of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, ..."

Zach: "foreigner, aliens" are appositives, not separate categories.

Says you. A comma is used to separate items in a list. It makes no sense to include two items that mean the same thing in a list. One definition of "foreigner" is someone from a different land.
One definition of "alien" is not one of us. There is at least a slight distinction, with the latter generally being considered to have a negative connotation.

Zach: We can tell from of the part of the Howard quote you left out:

I left it out because it hinges on the main point of contention: "and subject to their jurisdiction," Which you conflate with "within their jurisdiction." On this matter we are at an impasse.

Zach: Your reading would mean excluding the children of immigrants from citizenship, such as the millions of Italians, Poles, Germans, Mexicans, and Jews who came to America in the twentieth century.

Not so. Foreigners who immigrate to our country in accordance with our laws, present themselves for examination at a designated Port of Entry, and are admitted to the United States as a legal immigrant, start the journey to becoming naturalized Americans. America generously welcomes them into our family. Those who sneak across our borders, willfully repudiate our laws, steal the rightful choice away from us, by any reasonable consideration cannot be allowed by our own laws to also steal their way into citizenship.

Zach: Repeating is not the same as responding.

When you ignore the substance of the initial response, what is left to do but repeat it?

Zach: As supported by the rest of Howard's statement...His position was clear.

Indeed it was: "This will not , of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, ..."

Zach: Or to separate appositives,

Ah! So you have discovered that there is more than one way to use a comma.

Zach: How quickly they forget. You just said the Framers didn't include "foreigners" in the Fourteenth Amendment.

I didn't say that, I quoted the author of the amendment saying that. Here it is again:

Senator Jacob M. Howard: "This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, ..."

I mentioned a distinct subset of foreigners: "...foreigners who immigrate to our country "in accordance with our laws.."
Once a foreigner does that he becomes an immigrant. Illegal aliens stand far apart from that fact pattern.

Zach: Regardless, the question isn't about immigrants, who may or may not naturalize, but their newborn children.

The amendment starts with the subject "all persons born" So it is obviously talking about newborn babies. And about that the author of the amendment explained:

"This will not , of course, include persons born in the United States who are [i] foreigners, aliens, [i] ..."

How, considering the author's explication above, can someone be born in the United States as a foreigner while at the same time be an automatic US citizen?

Zach: according to Howard, the Amendment was just declaratory of the law of the land, which was birthright citizenship by natural law.

Senator Jacob M. Howard: "This will not , of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, ..."

Zach: That's not what Howard said. "foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign" are one category, not several.

Says you.


"This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are
(a) foreigners,
(b) aliens,
(c) who belong to the families of ambassadors or
(d)foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States,
but will include every other class of persons."

Several catagories. A list. Gramatically speaking, it is generally considered that a series of nouns or objects, separated by commas and ending with a conjunctive such as "or" indicates that the foregoing is a list of separate items. Your interpretation might be acccurate, but then again it might not. The history of the regulation of immigration in this country does not support your one dimensional interpretation. Before the 14th Amendment, Congress did little in the way of regulating immigration. But The Naturalization Act of 1790 certainly is an indication of the limited group of people to whom the original founders authorized naturalized citizenship .

"That any Alien being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof on application to any common law Court of record in any one of the States wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year at least, and making proof to the satisfaction of such Court that he is a person of good character, and taking the oath or affirmation prescribed by law to support the Constitution of the United States, which Oath or Affirmation such Court shall administer, and the Clerk of such Court shall record such Application, and the proceedings thereon; and thereupon such person shall be considered as a Citizen of the United States. And the children of such person so naturalized, dwelling within the United States, being under the age of twenty one years at the time of such naturalization, shall also be considered as citizens of the United States. And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond Sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born Citizens: Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States . . .

It is a tenuous supposition, at best, that the original founders intended that the babies of "aliens" who weren't included in this select group, and whose parents did not meet the very specific residency requirements, would be legally eligible for citizenship by way of naturalization or mere birth on the soil.


Zach: Otherwise, no children of immigrants would be eligible for birthright citizenship unless the parents naturalized before their children are born.

I mentioned a distinct subset of foreigners: "...foreigners who immigrate to our country "in accordance with our laws.."
Once a foreigner does that he becomes an immigrant. Illegal aliens stand far apart from that fact pattern.

Zach: In this case, the “who are” breaks the parallel structure of a noun list

The conjunctive "or" seems to mitigate against your pronouncement. Again, you were just making stuff up To backfill your argument.

Zach: Furthermore, “the every other class of person is expansive, not limited as you suggest.

It should not be hard to understand that the meaning of "every other class of person" must be limited by the author's own statement of his intent, and by the original founders' clear explication of whom they foresaw their progeny to be.

Zach: It’s usually best to apply the principle of generosity to try and determine his actual meaning. As birthright citizenship was already well-established, and as he references it directly as “natural law”, it’s clear he meant to apply it to immigrants.

And yet Congress, under watchful eye of the Supreme Court's Immigration Plenary Power Doctrine, after the 14th Amendment, proceeded to enact incrementally more rigid legislation to control and direct the path of immigration in this country, including several complete pauses of legal immigration, as well as immigration of people from certain identifiable cohorts.

Your continued conceit in implying that you know the minds of these authors without exploring the relevant historical context is intellectually dishonest.


Zach: Lynch v. Clarke (1844)

Thanks for the cite. This is a case with which I was unfamiliar until now. So I took a few minutes to read through it. First, it is a case about inheritance decided in the New York Court of Equity. At first glance, it is a lengthy and seemingly thorough exposition on the subject of birthright citizenship. My first, and therefore incomplete, read noticed some inconsistencies and omissions and some conclusions which seem to support your point of view and others which seem to support mine. In the end it appears that the court ruled that a woman who was born to Irish parents on American soil, all of whom returned to Ireland, had greater inheritance rights, as a citizen, then did her opponent in the matter of inheritance of an estate located in New York. The case was never appealed, although I saw in comments that it had been cited in Wong Kim Ark, which I intend to explore later. So it doesn't seem that it would have much precedence on a national scale. Other than that, I am unable to offer any further comment related to this case at this time .


Zach: Someone doesn’t stop being a “foreigner” by going through customs.

Maybe, but he stops being an illegal alien.

Nonsence.

Zach: You seem to base most of your argument on semantics.

Reading comprehension is important. I base most of my argument on a combination of language, the meaning of words as used at the time, and historical context.
(By the way, notice the series of commas followed by the conjunctive "and".)


Zach: It lacks the parallel structure required for a proper noun list.
"who belong" is not a noun in context. You need "those" before "who belong to the families of ambassadors" to make it function as a noun phrase

Native speakers of English can easily infer the word "those", thus completing the noun phrase and rendering the thought complete and sensical.

Your petty complaint is pedantic.

Zach: We have suggested using the principle of charity to discover the speaker’s actual intent.

And I have suggested using the speaker's actual words in their context to discover the speaker's actual intent.

Zach: Consider a Hessian who fought for the British who then stayed after the American Revolution. Can you get much more foreign than a foreign mercenary? He brought his wife from Germany and they had children. Would those children have been considered citizens? Of course they were.

Consider a British subject born in American colonies Who fought on the side of other colonists for independence. Under the British common law, as explicated by your New York Equity Court, his allegiance would automatically have transferred to the new jurisdiction. Those colonists who wish to remain subjects of the British Crown left their American holdings behind and moved to Canada thus restating their allegiance to the Crown and volunteering to be subject to the jurisdiction thereof. And yet for a period of time after the end of the war British naval ships were stopping American merchant ships on the high seas and conscripting Americans on these ships to service in the King's Navy on the presumption that since they were in America at a time when America was under the jurisdiction of the British crown that these Americans were still and in perpetuity would remain subject to the British. This was a matter of no small controversy between the two countries. And it seems to be a strong contradiction of your claim that the "common law" of the time was well understood and applied with a strong degree of equity.


I am beginning to suspect that you all are a learning tool for an AI computer farm in China. Following as you snake your way through the various discussions that you presume to hold court over on this site, it's a bit like watching a dog chase his own tail.

It's a bit amusing at first
And then you begin to wonder what's going on in the dogs mind.
You wonder what he hopes to accomplish.
Does he really expect to catch his own tail?
And if he actually succeeds, then what?
Has he then won a game that he just made up?
The game that he's only playing with himself?

Zach: It's not a legal precedent. What it shows is that birthright citizenship was a given in pre-Civil War America. There was no statute. It was inherited common law, "natural law" as Howard pointed out.

Well let's give that pronouncement some flesh, and this will take a a few pixels because you all tend to paint with a very broad brush.

Zach: What it shows is that birthright citizenship was a given in pre-Civil War America.

It does nothing of the sort. Did you bother to read the case? It was a case regarding a controversy of inheritance, presented before a New York State equity court. One of the persons in the controversy was a woman who was born on American soil to Irish parents, who after a brief time returned to Ireland with their child. Eventually a member of the family died leaving an estate in New York in which the child, domiciled in Ireland, was a party. The equity wrestled substantially with the claim made by the opposing party, that the Irishwoman was not a citizen of New York and therefore could not be a party in the controversy. That is the actual fact pattern of the case. But there are other points that can be inferred from the evidence discussed. First of all the Irish family - and specifically their daughter who was born on American soil - fit squarely within the specific definition of the limited group of people that the original Founders intended to welcome into the family of citizenship, expressed in the First Congress's Naturalization Act of 1790, To Wit "white people of good character."
They're Irish, so it can be well presumed that they are white. They had the means to travel across the Atlantic twice (no small cost at the time) and to leave an estate behind in New York. It can be well presumed that they would have been considered to be "people of good character." It is upon this frame that the judge hangs the whole of his deliberation. One can well imagine that the decision would have been starkly different had the party been a descendant of African slaves, or a Barbary pirate raiding the eastern seaboard.

So much for resting your case on a clear understanding of the common law.


Zach: "natural law" as Howard pointed out.

Howard: "This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States."

What could Howard have meant by this? There can be no doubt that he would have been aware of the Supreme Court's opinion on the matter, expressed in the infamous Dred Scott decision. It should be presumed that the Dred Scott Court would have been aware of the significance of British common law and natural law, as applied in jurisprudence of the day. So how then did the Dred Scott Court come to a decision that seems to completely contradict the New York State Equity Court, And why did Howard aver that the 14th Amendment simply declared what was the law of the land already? The Dred Scott Court had declared that (before the 14th Amendment) that understanding had [u] not [/i] been the law of the land. Who was correct, a majority of Supreme Court justices or a Senator from Michigan? Who would you trust more to make an historical binding legal decision, Justice Sotomayor or Representative Hank Johnson from Georgia?

These matters are not as simplistic as you make them out to be. And your arguments, once again, demonstrate the lack of depth that you bring to the table.

Zach: The Treat of Paris of 1783 recognized the jurisdiction of the United States as well as the citizenship of its people.

And yet the British Navy apparently did not feel compelled to honor the clearly established and well understood British common law that you hold in such high esteem .

Zach: There was nothing in the opinion concerning citizenship that depended on "good character".

Again: Reading comprehension is important. Graydog: "But there are other points that can be inferred from the evidence discussed."

Zach: Did you bother to read the case?

Again: Reading comprehension is important. Since I have now, twice, summarized the case in sufficient detail and in my own words, and expanded those summaries with inferences that I was able to draw from the opinion, it should be clear to any rational human being that I must have read the case! You are diminished by your unserious comment.

Zach: As you ask about common law, Taney said that slavery was statutory and had "no foundation in the law of nature or the unwritten common law." But on the citizenship question, Taney argued Blacks were excluded from "We the People" or as citizens under the Constitution at the founding.

Your point is a good one, but it does not support your overarching contention that the clear common law of the time (British common law) conveyed automatic citizenship (subjectship might be a better term under the circumstance) to all people born on the land within the jurisdiction thereof. How about after slavery was abolished in England? Were the children of freed Negro slaves then accorded birthright citizenship?

Zach: Blacks were excluded from "We the People" or as citizens under the Constitution at the founding.

As I demonstrated here several times, the original Founders, acting with Article Two authority in the very first Congress of the United States enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, which limited citizens to an exceedingly select group of prospects: "any Alien being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years," This fact speaks loudly against your argument.

Zach: That Blacks should have the same right to birthright citizenship as everyone else ... according to "natural law".

So did Negroes have this same right according to natural law all along and Taney (and almost everybody else) simply didn't realize it when referring to their own common law? Or did it suddenly materialize out of nothing? I'm trying to get a handle on your Schrodinger's version of common law.

Zach: You're not actually looking at the Taney court as having reached a just decision?

Of course not; it was a terrible decision. But it was the decision made by Supreme Court justices, presumably some of the finest legal minds in the land, who would have weighed and balanced the statutory law and the common/natural law, and whose decision was the final say in the matter until the passage of the 14th Amendment.

So what we have on both sides of the 14th Amendment are Supreme Court matters (Dred Scott on the before side, and Wong Kim Ark on the after side, as the two most prominent examples) that ignore and repudiate what you say was clearly understood common law regarding birthright citizenship on both sides of the Atlantic. (Unless you've been meaning to say all along that birthright citizenship applied only to free white persons who had resided within the United States for at least two years - and I'm sure that's not what you have been arguing.) You keep trying to explain away the inconsistencies in your moving target of an argument and I personally don't see that you're having much success in the effort.

Poppycock.

Zach Because, under British constitutional practice, a crown treaty could not override common law. That would take an act of parliament (Act of 1870).

A learned mind such as yours must be aware that Britain does not have a written constitution upon which to practice "constitutional practice"; certainly not as might be analogous to the American Constitution, which you disingenuously imply. As far as an Act of Parliament enacted in 1870, curious minds would like to know: was this act in effect in 1800 when the British Navy was illegally shanghaiing American sailors?


Zach Our position on common law is more descriptive than prescriptive.

Well that attempt at simulating an honest answer is a bit oleaginous, even for all of you.


Zach Notably, murder is still a common law crime in England and Wales,

Perhaps it's just me, but I fail to understand how the treatment of crimes that presently occur in England and Wales is germane to the extant discussion.


Zach Calvin's Case (1608) was color-blind.

Man, Zach! You surprise even me With your unabashed disingenuousness. You seed your comments with obscure citations like this one, and you really don't expect your interlocutor to look into the matter? Incredible.

Rather than go into another long summary and explication in my own words about this case, I will simply quote from the first commentary my web search discovered (and for the record I read several commentaries and the ancient case itself. For whatever that's worth.)

"The statement that Calvin's Case (1608) was color-blind is not supported by the provided search context, as the case was fundamentally a legal dispute regarding allegiance to the monarch rather than race or skin color."

There is much more, but this attempt at obfuscation is beneath even you, Zach.


Zach That is incorrect. That Act only concerned naturalization, not birthright citizenship or inherited citizenship (children of citizens).

I'm going to come back to this in more detail in my wrapup, but my statement was the exact opposite of incorrect, your ignorant pronouncement notwithstanding.


Zach TYou seem to misunderstand common law.

No I'm pretty sure I'm not the one with a comprehension problem.


Zach You see an inconsistency because you misunderstand common law.

No... I'm pretty sure that's not it... No, I think it's because your Schrodinger's argument is so full of omissions and inconsistencies.


Zach The Taney Court ruled that the written Constitution precluded Black citizenship.

And so the written law holds precedence over common or natural law, and Taney's unfortunate decision could reach no other choice. Is that what you're saying? Because it sounds like you're abandoning your argument in favor of mine.


Zach Liberty is a natural right. The American and British constitutions have been imperfect instruments in protecting liberty.

I agree with this statement except for your implication that Britain has a constitution that is analogous to ours. It does not and never has.


The founders of this great country, referring to themselves collectively as "We the People," specifically stated that they were establishing a more perfect union for themselves and their posterity. (They made no mention at all about the rest of the world or its suffering refugees.) They were comprised of a group who originated from white Christian Protestants who emigrated from Western Europe. This is a historical fact and necessary context to understand the nature of the discussion. You disregard this important context, among others, and that does fatal damage to your point of view.

One of the very first acts of this newly established government was to clarify from whom the new country would draw the new citizens that it would need to grow and prosper (excepting, of course, their own children.) And that new group, they stated without equivocation, could only come from white persons of good character who had resided in the new country for at least two years. It is illogical and inconceivable that these learned men who spent weeks carefully crafting the framework and language upon which to hang a new government would intend to allow aliens to bypass an examination process (by way of their unborn children) who did not match their strict description and who had no legitimate connection whatsoever to the new culture that they were making out of nothing, by repudiating the legitimate prerogatives of the legal sovereign: (We the people). Now, admittedly, illegal citizenship didn't become codified until the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act (upon which poor Wong Kim Ark found himself unexpectedly impaled), enacted in 1882 over 135 years ago. Wong Kim Ark is often incorrectly mal-cited by people of your persuasion, in an attempt to bolster a falacious argument that favors universal birthright citizenship (presuming people aren't actually going to do their own research into the case.) Wong Kim Ark recognized birthright citizenship in its proper context. If the matter were as cut and dried as you maintain - and it most certainly is not - then the matter would have gone something like this:

(Scuffling on the docks while disembarking the ship, newly arrived from China)
"Hey there! Where do you think you're going, Chinaman?"
"Home."
"What do you mean home, isn't that where you just came from?"
"No, I was born here. I've lived here my whole life."
"Oh. Sorry. Welcome home brother!"


But that's not how it went, was it? Poor citizen Ark had to endure the machinations of our wonderful judiciary until it finally made its way to the Supreme Court. Where, if you're understanding of the common law of birthright citizenship were accurate, the proceedings should have gone much as described above. But they didn't, did they?

Supreme Court (finally!)

"Mr Clerk what's our next case?"
"Chinaman Wong Kim Ark entering our country illegally, Sir."
"Mr Ark, what do you have to say for yourself?"
"I was born here."
"What's that?"
"Respectfully Sir, I was born here. I've lived here my whole life."
"Mister Clerk?"
"That's what all of the submitted evidence indicates, your Honor. There is no doubt."
"Well then, welcome home son! Case dismissed!"

But that's not how it went at all, was it? The matter hinged not just on whether Wong Kim Ark had been born in the jurisdiction, but on a multiplicity of other factors as well, including the legality of original immigration, the establishment of a domicile, a lived intent to assimilate into the culture based upon activities and behavior while here, among other things.
A natural right to citizenship simply because of the accident of being born on the soil to immigrants who themselves were here legally was not at all assumed by the Court.

This is part of the overarching context, ably demonstrated in the opinion, to which I keep referring and that you ignore or omit because it is inconvenient to your argument. Legislation that Congress has passed, and that the Supreme Court has mostly upheld, in the intervening century and a third, continues to mitigate against your notion of assumed universal birthright citizenship.

Zach: Just because the British constitution doesn't look like the American constitution doesn't mean the British don't have a constitution, especially in the sense of "constitutional practice".

Comparing the British c onstitution to the American C onstitution is like comparing a romance novel to an old scuffed up shoe box full of love letters and post it notes. Your attempt to equate the two is disingenuous.

Zach: Calvin's Case is hardly obscure in terms of birthright citizenship.

Well, you dodged the softball question that has an easy answer, one that almost entirely supports your point of view, and instead lobbed out "Calvin's Case" with no further explanation.
My question was specific to the children born in Britain to recently freed black slaves. "Calvin's Case," decided almost 200 years prior to the freeing of slaves in Britain proper, is an insufficient answer. (slaps forehead and mutters "aw, jeez, yeah, I forgot all about Calvin's Case.")

Zach: You were incorrect. The Act did not limit "citizens"

As I have explained here many times, the Act very specifically limited to a very select and exclusive group of people, the pool from which new citizens the original founders thought eligible to be invited into the community of Americans .
And I've explained that I use the language of that act to support my contention that it is unlikely in the extreme that these brilliant Founders would have intended to allow automatic citizenship to the children of people who purposely sneak in through a back door that was unfortunately left ajar.

Zach: Were the children of immigrants of bad character (lots of those in Georgia, a former penal colony), who did not naturalize, citizens of the United States?

Interesting question and one would I would like to consider. But you would need to be more specific: Were both mother and father incarcerated? Recidivists? Did either reform and restore their formerly bad character? Is there such a thing in the civic mind as redemption ?


Zach: The majority opinion explicitly rejected cultural limitations.

I would like to hear your defense of this comment.

In rereading Both the majority and dissenting opinions, I see the fact pattern - which indelibly includes Mr Ark's connection to the local community - repeated over and over again. And while there was not then the panoply of laws that we have now describing the processes for entering our country, and describing the different conditions that would enable someone of American parentage to attain citizenship while born abroad, there was nonetheless a recognition that there was a requirement to obey our laws and that Wong Kim Ark's parents had not violated any in establishing their domicile in this country before he was born. A claim that those facts didn't matter in the deliberations suggests an insufficient acquaintance with the decision. Further it is evident that when Mr Ark returned from his visit with his parents in China, he presented himself to what now would be termed a “designated port of entry.” as was required by the laws of the time. [b] He complied fully with the laws of the jurisdiction to whose subjection he had never recanted his allegiance.
The dissenting justices (whose conclusion I disagree with, for whatever that's worth) provide a lengthy and equally thorough examination of the British common law as applied in the American Republic (and a thorough examination, from a slightly different perspective and with their own citations to authoritative deliberations), on the nature of birthright citizenship as explicated in the common law and applied in the American colonies. "Allegiance and protection are, in this connection" (that is, in relation to citizenship), reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other: allegiance for protection, and protection for allegiance. . . .". (Chief Justice Waite, The Slaughterhouse Cases)


I think we should end this discussion now out of respect for our very benevolent and tolerant host, so I'll let you have the last say again.

But I have two points I'd like to make before moving my attention to nominally more productive efforts . (The bills don't pay themselves.)

1. My intention in these discussions has been entirely in opposition to the notion of automatic birthright citizenship to children born to illegal aliens who arrive within our borders by repudiating our legitimate laws that dictate the manner in which aliens can legally enter our country, and who thereby effectively deny the obligation of a reciprocal relationship and so unilaterally deny the prerogative of choice to the sovereign (We the people.)

2. The extensive jurisprudence and the voluminous laws that regulate immigration and other forms of permitted entry into our country obviate against condescension to a certain conclusion as to the intent of the founders of this nation and the authors of the 14th Amendment.

We will discover soon enough whether the current Supreme Court has the courage to take up this matter in a substantive way or whether they punt again by merely considering whether an executive order has any authority at all in this matter. Further, I predict that it will be a narrowly decided decision, that the minority will publish vociferous and thorough dissents, and that roughly half the country will be at least disappointed in the outcome.

Adieu.37hl