Maggie's Farm

Mr. Xi is in an unprecedented and almost impossible position. Mao didn’t have any other senior leader lurking behind his back because he had won power through a war against his rival, nationalist generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

. . . Mr. Xi has been trying to cut off Jiang and all previous leaders, but there are simply too many. There are people from Mr. Hu’s generation, from Jiang’s generation, and even some rare survivors of Deng’s times. They have privileges, political access, a network of friends and allies, and shield one another.

To isolate them totally would deprive Mr. Xi of part of his own legitimacy, derived from being born into this elite. But to keep them around undermines Xi’s power.

. . . . Here there is another turn to China’s complex conundrum. If Mr. Xi were to try to solve his power issues by democratizing the political system, many in the Party would call him a “traitor.” The party structure is actually the big problem here. In many domestic and international issues, the interests of the Party trump those of the country.

For instance, would China benefit from a freely convertible currency and a freer market? Long-term, yes, but this would endanger the Party’s hold on power, as a possible financial crisis would shake the Party’s rigid grip.

. . . Similarly, the interests of Party elders—keeping the bloated and ineffective privileged caste with its fingers in the cake of power—are against Mr. Xi who would like a more effective and responsive rule. In theory, comprehensive reform of the party structure would be necessary to have a clear “rule of law.” But some retired veterans are not actually interested in the state’s long-term interests but in recovering their half-lost dominance. If Mr. Xi doesn’t solve the issue, the many contradictions could make the system stall or explode in time.