COIN, the abbreviation for counterinsurgency operations, is hotly debated as applied in Afghanistan.
Those most blindly in favor on the Left think it a way to be nice and avoid many of the harshnesses of war. Others think it’s a way to make foes like us and avoid creating more foes.
Those most angrily critical are either conservatives, experienced in war, or those whose lives are actually at risk on the front lines.
They are all partly correct, that far. Where many go off the rails is in not understanding what COIN actually is, or in taking it to absurd or counter-productive excess, and in not confronting the quagmire of Obama and his chosen meddlers.
Let’s re-visit the US entry in large numbers into Vietnam.
President Kennedy’s “best and brightest” were enamored of their theories of guerrilla warfare and thought that would be enough to rely upon in countering the Viet Cong, its North Vietnamese masters, and their Soviet and Chinese backers. When that didn’t work, and they lashed out in frustration to blame President Diem out of their arrogance and ignorance, they participated in his murder and destroyed his hard-won control of the South. The US, then, had to send more and more troops to stem the disaster, and the Kennedy boys turned against the war aghast that there was actually a war to be fought.
That ignorance and lack of integrity and regard for the actual lives and national security interests at stake continues in the Left.
President Obama is the child of those and more dangerous ideological fools and connivers against the primacy of US interests, with whatever it takes. The mantra is be accommodating and our foes will come around to cooperation.
That’s written large in President Obama’s failed foreign policies: ignoring and undermining allies and rewarding adversary nations directly and indirectly via their taking advantage of his weakness and weakening of ourselves and our allies.
Back to COIN.
Despite some lapses, grossly exaggerated by the Left, we had fairly strict rules-of-engagement in Vietnam. There was the natural humanness of American fighting men and the recognition that acting in excess was not in the best interests of our mission. I watched at the General command level in Vietnam this in play every day.
Going forward to Iraq and Afghanistan, those of us who were steeped in Vietnam were shocked at the lessons learned that were forgotten by much of our military leadership.
The US military leadership today are advanced with required post-graduate degrees from top universities, where theories outflank realities, and by increased political maneuvering to satisfy liberal politicians. It’s sometimes amazing there are any at the top left who retain the warrior culture and sense that is essential to winning against whatever enemy or odds.
There’s more of them below the top, schooled in the real world by living in it at the front, thankfully. To them we owe everything.
General Petraeus is lauded as the primary author of the "new" COIN. Dig below the fancy words and it’s just the re-realization that our forces have to be among the people, first fighting and providing security and then building their own defenses. There is no strict dogma that US forces have to be recklessly endangered. In Iraq, COIN is given too much credit compared to the resolve of Iraqis to fight against the oppressive, bloodthirsty jihadists once assured that President Bush was firmly committed to stay and do whatever necessary to protect and back them.
Iraq war reporter and critic Tom Ricks comments:
What allowed Petraeus to succeed in Iraq was not the troop surge itself; after all, a city as big and sprawling as Baghdad, with 5 million people living in two- and three-story homes, can swallow 30,000 troops without a burp. Nor was it his development of a counterinsurgency doctrine for the Army. The key tenets -- such as focusing on protecting the population, while still going after the diehard insurgents, and splitting rather than uniting the enemy -- were familiar stuff to anyone who had read the books. It seemed novel only in the context of Iraq, where for many years the American commanders had terrified families by knocking down doors in the middle of the night, treating locals not as the prize to be won but as the playing field on which they confronted the insurgents.
Rather, Petraeus's critical contribution in Iraq was one of leadership: He got everyone on the same page. Until he arrived, there often seemed to be dozens of wars going on, with every brigade commander trying to figure out the strategic goals of a campaign.
Fast forward to Afghanistan. After the blunder of largely ignoring it while painfully trekking through Iraq, President Obama echoed the Left’s anti-Iraq deception that Afghanistan should have been our priority instead, instead of also.
That would have required a larger force structure than the Congress or the President was willing to face up to spending for and building, after the “peace dividend” reckless spending and severe drawdown of our forces after the fall of the Soviet empire. But, nevermind that reality, said the Left and most Republican spendthrifts.
President Obama definitely inherited a mess heading toward defeat in Afghanistan. Hoisted by his own petard of advocating that Afghanistan is the “better” war, he set about asking for the best military advice. He ruminated for months while the situation there grew worse. Then he chose to go halfway on the troop size recommendations, many of whom are still yet to arrive. Obama chose a real warrior to command, General McChrystal of deserved special ops fame, a COIN believer, coincidentally politically amenable since McChrystal voted for Obama.
General McChrystal struggled mightily, accomplished much, but also took COIN to extremes in rules-of-engagement that weakened our mission, endangered our troops, and, together with the encouragement given the Taliban by President Obama’s artificial time-limit for staying, encouraged the Taliban to not fear us as they should and Afghanis to fear the Taliban more.
Now that General Petraeus is in command, there are dreams that he will pull the bacon from the fire.
First, as any and every knowledgeable observer recognizes, the civilians that President Obama put in place in Afghanistan and Washington, who have hobbled and botched everything they’ve come near, have to go, and fast, replaced by a national security and diplomatic team from the real world. But, Obama asserts, "I'm confident that we've got a team in place that can execute," despite the clear evidence to the contrary.
Second, the time limit must be reversed, and the US commitment expressed loudly as unswervable. President Obama, perhaps recognizing the damage done and under pressure to undo it, is beginning to equivocate that the deadline is only a beginning.
Third, COIN must be reined in from a rigid dogma to a tactic to be adapted and applied in achievement of the mission, rather than an end in itself. You know you’re dealing with an evasive cover-up of inanity when ridiculously endangering your life is remarketed, as it was by McChrystal, as “courageous restraint.”
This third may be realized by General Petraeus, if this report in the London Telegraph is to be believed:
He is to re-examine the rules which some soldiers believe have prevented them from defending themselves.
"There will be no change in overall policy but all aspects of tactics and implementation will be looked at afresh," a Pentagon official told The Daily Telegraph. "The issue of 'courageous restraint' is a controversial one on the ground and there may be ways it can be modified."…
Changes to allow soldiers more flexibility in using lethal force are likely to be welcomed by both American and British troops….
But some senior officers believe that Gen McChrystal's tactical directives were too rigid….
While the principle of avoiding civilian casualties is certain to remain at the centre of Afghanistan strategy, restrictive rules of engagement that require platoon commanders to seek higher authority before escalating force might be modified.
"Petraeus was the man in Iraq to row back from the indiscriminate use of force but he is not allergic to the use of heavy weapons and air power against an enemy area," said a military analyst who was attached to his staff in Iraq.
"His approach is to get the troops among the population and build relationships on the ground. If that involves killing while trying to engage the locals then so be it."…
A British official who also worked with Gen Petraeus said: "Gen McChrystal imposed courageous restraint as a mantra whereas the big theme of Gen Petraeus was strategic patience.
"The difference between the two is important. Gen Petraeus believes in getting all elements in place through a slow strategic build up but he also prizes the importance of momentum by walking through the streets and taking them on."
These proven experts at JINSA get it.
So do the Taliban:
However, a spokesman for the Taliban, Yousuf Ahmadi, told the Agence France-Presse news agency there would be no change in the insurgency.
"We don't care whether it's McChrystal or Petraeus. Our position is clear. We'll be fighting the invading forces until they leave," he said.
Now, President Obama must start to actually do his job as Commander-in-Chief. Anyone believe that?
