Maggie's Farm

That rhetorical question from Barry Goldwater still haunts us today.  Many of us who supported the US being in Vietnam found ourselves in the uncomfortable posture of, in effect, backing President Johnson’s floundering, painful, costly half-way measures.  Instead of early on going deep and hard to close Haiphong, punish Hanoi, and cut the infiltration routes, the US dribbled in and hesitated.  What earlier forcefulness would have yielded is indicated by the more compliant reaction from North Vietnam immediately following our major Linebacker pummeling of it in 1972.

Analogies can be misleading.  Rather, the question of why not victory is to open readers’ minds to wider possibilities than appear in most of the discussions of what to do about Afghanistan.  The very concept of victory seems to have disappeared from our vocabulary and consciousness.

Victory is the accomplishment of the objective of a reasonably lasting situation in which Afghanistan is not a threat to its neighbors nor ourselves in the West.  Pakistan’s nukes cannot be allowed to fall into the hands of foes.  Iran cannot be allowed to extend its influence, or coercion, upon others.  India’s security interests must be respected.

The arguments against a perimeter containment are compelling, as ineffective.  The arguments against complete or hasty withdrawal are compelling, as worsening the threats.  The arguments against solely counter-insurgency without enough securing forces are compelling, as inadequate.

Democratization, modernization, social services, etc. may be tactics toward the objective, but are insufficient without trusted security.  Security requires seriously reduced cross-border sanctuaries and support together with seriously diminished internal capabilities of Taliban, Al Quaeda and drug lords.

For Afghanistan’s sake, as well as other corollary objectives, that means several measures:  1. Surgically take out Pakistan’s nuclear capability, combined with India’s open pledge and actions to reduce its arming, presence and targeting of Pakistan, recognizing that India’s fears of Pakistan are real;  2. Substantially take out Iran’s nuclear capability, and embargo its critical gas imports; 3. Buy Afghanistan’s opium production while simultaneously training and supplying Afghans who cooperate with viable replacement crops and businesses, to reduce the funds flow to drug lords; 4. With vote of Congress, commit 100,000 more primarily combat troops to Afghanistan to clear and hold, while energetically pursuing longer (2-3 years, at least) building up of competent Afghan security forces, us and they pursuing forward counter-insurgency.

In 1964, Goldwater lost by a landslide.  The rest is history, or commentary.  President Obama, like President Johnson, deserves respect and support for not bugging out.  However, experts judge both’s half-way courses result in long drawn out losses.

In 2006, President Bush changed course in Iraq.  The loud bipartisan support from Senators Lieberman and McCain, commanding the center, was critical.  They have again come forth. “Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan: A middle path of muddling through is the real recipe for quagmire and loss of public support.”

Barry Goldwater’s words in 1964 are as appropriate now: “Why Not Victory?...I’m convinced that in this year 1964 we must face up to our conscience and make a definite choice. We must decide what sort of people we are and what sort of world we want–now and for our children.”